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KEENE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
R. W. TAYLOR STEEL 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
RALPH w. TAYLOR and 
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 15787 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action based upon contract seeking the re-
covery of the purchase price of goods sold to Grating, Inc., 
plus attorneys' fees and interest under trade account guar-
antees between the plaintiff-respondent Keene Corporation 
(hereinafter "Keene") and defendant-appellants R. W. Taylor 
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Steel Company, Ralph W. Taylor and Lou Jean M. Taylor (her• 
inafter "Taylors"). 
STATEMEl~T OF FACTS AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In 1965, Grating, Inc. was organized for the purpo~~ 
marketing, distributing and fabricating steel grating prod· 
ucts including steel bar grating by Ralph w. Taylor, its 
President and Chief Executive Officer. At this time, 
Grating Inc. entered into an agreement with Keene to beco~ 
a distributor of its grating products. As a result, Grating, 
Inc. began and continued to purchase substantially all of 
its steel grating from Keene and continued to do so up until 
April 18, 1975. 
On April 26, 1973 R. W. Taylor Steel, Ralph w. TaylM 
and Lou Jean M. Taylor entered into two agreements with K~• 
guaranteeing Grating, Inc.'s trade account with Keene. 
Throughout the period of time Grating, Inc. purchas~ 
its grating from Keene and particularly in the later part of 
1974 and early 1975 Keene represented to Grating, Inc. that 
Grating, Inc. was purchasing steel grating from Keene at 
prices as low or lower than available from competing 
manufacturers. 
In late 1974 and early 1975 Grating, Inc. discovered 
that, contrary to Keene's representations Keene, had been 
selling grating to Grating, Inc. at prices well above prices 
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at which other manufacturers were selling the same products 
to Grating, Inc. 's competitors. 
As a result of this discovery as well as other facts 
which are set forth in the Preliminary Statement Concerning 
Grating, Inc.'s Federal AntiTrust Claims on pages 8 and 9 
of this brief, Grating terminated its relationship with 
Keene and on ~- la ;y£· filed suit in the United States ,/,..____ __ _____ 
District Court, District of Utah, Northern Division (Grating, 
Inc. v. Keene Corporation and Harsco, NC-75-21) alleging 
that Keene and a competing manufacturer by the name of-
Harsco had violated the federal antitrust laws in their 
dealings with Grating, Inc. 
Between Mczrcn 3_1,~_and ~ating 
received deliveries of steel grating with a total purchase 
price of $66,674.16. 
Because Grating, Inc. felt that it had been overcharged 
by Keene on these purchases as well as many prior purchases 
that had been paid for in full resulting in damages to 
Grating well in excess of $66,674.16, Grating did not pay 
for these shipments. 
Keene filed a counterclaim against Grating, Inc. in the 
federal antitrust action for the amounts of the unpaid 
deliveries and on July 31, 1975 filed this action against 
the Taylors as trade account guarantors of Grating, Inc. In 
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their answer to Keene's Complaint in this action the Taylors 
set forth several affirmative defenses, including defenses 
that the contracts for purchase of these unpaid deliveri~ 
were illegal in that they are in violation of federal 
antitrust laws and were therefore unenforceable and further 
that Keene breached its contract with Grating, Inc. in ~~ 
a condition to the contract of sale was that Grating, Inc. 
would be charged no more than that charged by competing 
manufacturers for similar goods and that Grating, Inc. has a 
valid set-off exceeding the amount claimed by Keene. 
On October 4, .1~76 Keene filed a Notice of Readine~ 
For Trial. (Record, p. 77). In response the Taylors filed 
a Motion to Stay the Proceedings until resolution of the 
federal anti-trust action. (Record, p. 78). 
On December 30, 1976 the court ruled that the action 
would proceed to trial on all issues except the defenses 
based upon violations of federal antitrust laws. (Record, 
pp. 11 0-111 ) • 
On February 17, 1977 Keene filed a motion for Summary 
Judgment on the ground that as a matter of law antitrust 
violations may not be asserted as a defense to a contract 
action. (Record, pp. 128-129). 
On June 28, 1977 the court ordered that its previous 
order staying a determination of the defenses based on 
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antitrust violation would be vacated and ordered that a 
pretrial conference be held at which time Keene's Motion for 
summary Judgment would be heard. (Record, pp. 161-162). 
On October 25, 1977 the court, after the pre-trial 
hearing, ordered that Taylors' defense based on violation of 
federal antitrust laws be stricken on the ground that they 
are not available as a matter of law and that the case 
proceed to trial on the issues of whether a condition of the 
contract was that Grating, Inc. would not be charged more 
than that charged other customers of Keene and whether 
Grating, Inc. would not be charged more than that charged 
by competing manufacturers. (Record, pp. 164-166). 
On November 10, 1977 the court entered a further order 
granting Partial Summary Judgment in the amount of $40,000.00 
in favor of Keene, representing the agreed reasonable value 
of the goods sold to Grating, Inc. and dismissed the defense 
that Grating, Inc. would be charged no more than other 
customers of Keene. 
The court further ordered that the case should proceed 
to trial on the single issue of whether Grating, Inc. was 
entitled to deduction because of the defense that a condi-
tion of the contract was that Grating, Inc. would not be 
charged more than that charged by other manufacturers of 
similar goods. (Record, pp. 185-188). 
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A non-jury trial of this action was held on November 2! 
and 30, 1977. 
On January 13, 1978 the court filed a Memorandum 
Opinion in which the court concluded Keene had in fact 
represented and assured Grating that it was receiving a 
"competitive price" but these misrepresentations were a 
breach of a moral obligation and not a legal obligation. 
The court concluded that the law of sales and the statutes 
involved would not prevent Keene from benefiting from breach 
of moral trust. The court invited the plaintiff to prepa~ 
findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with ~~ 
opinion. (Record, pp. 189-192). 
On January 24, 1978 Findings of Fact and Conclusions~ 
Law and a Judgment in the amount of $66,674.16 together witl 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $10,334.47 and post 
judgment interest at eight percent was entered. (Record, 
pp. 223-225). 
On January 26, 1978 Keene filed a Motion for Costs i~ 
eluding a reasonable attorney's fee. (Record, pp. 198-199), 
On January 27, 1978 the Taylors filed an Objection~ 
Keene's Memorandum of Costs together with a Motion to Have 
the Costs Taxed by the Court. (Record, p. 205). 
On February 3, 1978 the Taylors filed a Motion to Alt11 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or Amend Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (Record, p. 208). 
On March 17, 1978 a Judgment was entered awarding Keene 
attorneys' fees in the sum of $14,501.16 and costs in the 
amount of $334.10 together with interest at the rate of 
eight percent per annum. (Record, pp.245-246). Additionally 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to the 
Judgment for attorneys' fees was entered on March 17, 1978 
(Record pp. 242-244) together with an Order denying Taylors' 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (Record, pp. 237-238). 
On April 17, 1978 the Taylors filed an Amended Notice 
of Appeal appealing from the court's Order dated October 25, 
1977, the Order in Partial Summary Judgment dated November 
10, 1977, the Judgments and Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law dated January 24, 1978 and March 17, 1978 and the 
Order dated March 17, 1978. (Record, p. 248). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the court's Order of 
October 25, 1977 striking the defenses based upon antitrust 
violations; a reversal of the Judgment together with Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated January 24, 1978; a 
reversal of the Judgment together with Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated March 17, 1978 and a reversal of 
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the Order dated March 17, 1978. 
Further the appellant seeks an order remanding the case 
to the district court with instructions to stay all proceed-
ings including any proceedings to collect the Partial 
Summary Judgment for $40,000 until the completion of the 
federal antitrust action. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT CONCERNING 
PENDING FEDERAL ANTITRUST CLAIMS 
The critical issues raised by this appeal result from 
the pendancy of an antitrust action in the Federal District 
Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division, entitled 
Grating, Inc. v. Keene Corporation and Harsco, NC-75-21. 
Due to its relevance in determining these issues a 
brief explanation of Grating, Inc.' s claims against Keene in 
the federal action is warranted. 
As previously stated, in 1965 Grating, Inc. became a 
distributor of grating products for Keene and has purchas~ 
substantially all of its grating from Keene from 1965 to 
April, 1975. Commencing in approximately 1971 and contin~ 
ing until Grating, Inc. ceased dealing with Keene in April, 
1975, Keene required Grating, Inc. to resell the grating 
products purchased from Keene to its customers at prices 
fixed by Keene and a competing manufacturer by the name of 
Harsco. 
-8-
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Commencing in late 1973, after the Taylors had entered 
into the trade account Guarantee Agreements with Keene, 
Keene began a series of price hikes, raising the prices at 
which Grating, Inc. was purchasing the grating products from 
Keene to levels well above the prices competing manufacturers 
were selling the same products to Grating's competitors. 
At the same time Keene assured Grating that it was 
receiving a "competitive price". 
In the federal action Grating has alleged that these 
price increases were an integral part of a scheme whereby 
Keene and Harsco fixed the price at which its agents and 
distributors, including Grating, Inc. could resell their 
product thus dividing the market. Then Keene increased the 
price at which Grating, Inc. would buy the products from 
Keene. The purpose of this scheme was to insure that 
Grating, Inc. would keep its relative share of the market 
but also insure that the profits would be passed onto Keene. 
Additionally Grating, Inc. has alleged that Keene 
prevented Grating from purchasing grating from other manu-
facturers by conspiring with other manufacturers or sup-
pliers to either not sell to Grating or to sell at prices at 
~higher than Keene's price to Grating, Inc. 
As a result of these violations Grating, Inc. is 
claiming damages to its business in excess of One Million 
Dollars. 
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POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 
CAN NEVER BE A PROPER DEFENSE IN A CON-
TRACT ACTION. 
15 u.s.c. S1 states that "Every contract ••• in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Similarly, 
Utah Code Annotated S50-1-1 (1953, as amended) provides that 
"Any combination by persons having for its object or effort 
the controlling of the prices of ••• any article of manufac· 
ture or commerce ••• is prohibited and unlawful." And, 
Section 50-1-6 of the Utah Code declares that "Any contract 
or agreement in violation of any provision of this chapter 
shall be absolutely void." (Emphasis added). 
During the entire course of this action there has 
been an antitrust action pending in the U.S. District Court 
of Utah, Northern Division, entitled Grating, Inc. v. KeeM 
Corporation and Harsco, Civil No. NC-75-21, filed April U, 
1975. The appellants in the present appeal are the plain-
tiffs in the federal antitrust action, and are alleging ~ 
that action that Keene Corporation is guilty of a price 
fixing scheme which greatly raised the price at which 
appellant could purchase grating. If this allegation is 
found to be correct, then the contracts under considerati~ 
in this case would be illegal, void and of no effect since 
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they made up part of the alleged inflated price umbrella. 
However, this defense of illegality and antitrust 
violation was stricken by the lower court in its Order 
of October 25, 1977: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as it seeks 
to have stricken any defense or set off including 
the First, Second and Fourth Affirmative Defenses 
in the Answer based in whole or in part on the 
antitrust laws of the United States is granted on 
the ground that such defenses are not available to 
defendants as a matter of law. (Record, p. 165). 
Ruling as a matter of law that an antitrust violation is not 
available as a defense was totally improper. 
A. Antitrust Violations Have Been Allowed 
As Defenses To Contract Actions. 
Although it is concededly true that "As a defense to an 
action based on contract, the plea of illegality based on 
violation of the Sherman Act has not met with much favor," 
Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 518 (1959), there have been 
cases which have held the defense to be perfectly valid. 
The reason so much confusion exists as to whether the 
defense should be allowed in a contract action was stated by 
one commentator: "Though a rose is always a rose, contracts 
are of different types, and antitrust violations take many 
forms." Sobel, Antitrust Defenses to Contract Actions: A 
~estion of Policy Priorities, 16 Antitrust Bull. 455 at 
456 ( 19 71 ) • 
-11-
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Keene Corporation, in its Memorandum in Support of Its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 17, 1977 (Record, 
pp. 120-127), cites a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases 
which have not allowed the defense of antitrust violation ~ 
a contract action. However, since all contracts and all 
antitrust violations are somewhat different, the cases 
cited by Keene and presumably relied upon by the lower 
court should be examined to see if they are controlling in 
the present case. 
It would seem obvious that in order for an antitrust 
violation to be allowed as a contract defense, there should 
first be a violation. Yet in many of the cases relied upon, 
the court held that there was not a clear violation of the 
antitrust laws: A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 u.s. 
248 (1925): D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining 
Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915): Dickstein v. Dupont, 443 F.2d 783 
(1st Cir. 1971). Two of the cases relied upon involved 
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act which the court has 
made clear will never be a defense to contract actions: 
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 
(1947): Exxon Corp. v. Time Industries, Inc., 1974-1 Trade 
Cases, '74,926 at 96,146 (E.D. Mich. 1974). 
In a couple of the cases cited by Keene in its memor-
andum, the contracts in question were held to be clearly 
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collateral to, and quite distinct from, the alleged anti-
trust violations. In these cases the court enforced the 
contract to prevent the unjust enrichment of allowing a 
person to receive another's property without making payment 
therefore. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Connolly 
v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902). 
There have been cases, however, with remarkably simi-
lar fact situations to the case under appeal here, in which 
the defense has been upheld. See Continental Wall Paper 
Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909); Marathon 
Oil Co. v. Hadley, 197 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). 
In the Continental Wall Paper case, the plaintiff and 
defendant entered into an agreement whereby the defendant 
wall paper distributor was to purchase all of its require-
ments from the plaintiff for a price to be established by 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff was part of a combination 
which had been raising the price of wall paper in violation 
of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff delivered wall paper 
to defendant who refused to pay the inflated price demanded 
by the plaintiff. 
In an action for the price of goods sold and delivered, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant could validly 
raise the defense of antitrust violation, which would 
Prevent the plaintiff from recovering the fixed and exces-
-13-
j 
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sive price. In so holding the majority declared that a 
court should not: 
••• lend its aid, in any way, to a party seeking 
to realize the fruits of an agreement that ap-
pears tainted with illegality, although the re-
sult of applying that rule may sometimes be to 
shield one who has got something for which as 
between man and man he ought perhaps, to pay ••• 
212 u.s. at 262. 
The Marathon Oil Co. case, supra, was an action against 
the guarantors of an oral trade account whereby the buyer 
was to purchase gas and oil exclusively from the plaintiff 
seller and re-sell the product at prices fixed by the 
plaintiff. The court held that the contract violated the 
state antitrust laws and was thus illegal and void. The 
court further held that the plaintiff seller could not 
recover the price of goods sold and delivered from the 
guarantors when the primary agreement violated the antitrust 
laws: wThe contract of Mrs. L. M. Hadley to guarantee t~ 
payment for purchases thereafter to be made by J. Hall 
Hadley was tainted with the same vice of illegality as ~~ 
inuring in the original contract with J. Hall Hadley.• 101 
s.w. 2d at 886. 
These cases show that under the proper circumstancesa 
defense of antitrust violation is totally proper in a cor 
tract action. In the case E. Bement & Sons v. National 
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902), the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated: w[A]nyone sued upon a contract may set up as a 
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defense that it is a violation of the act of Congress [Anti-
trust laws], and, if found to be so, the fact will consti-
tute a good defense to the action." Id. at 88. 
B. It Would Be Consistent With Public Policy 
To Allow The Defense In This Case For Any 
Alleged Liability Greater Than The Fair 
Market Value Of The Goods Sold And Deli-
vered. 
On October 31, 1977, the lower court heard argument on 
Keene's Motion for Summary Judgment, and granted Keene 
Partial Summary Judgment in the amount of $40,000, the 
undisputed fair market value of the grating sold and deli-
vered. (Record, p. 172). After granting the partial summary 
judgment, the lower court should have ordered the action for 
the balance of the alleged $67,674.16 stayed pending the 
resolution of the federal antitrust action. This would 
have been consistent with the policies of preventing unjust 
enrichment and not having a court enforce illegal agreements. 
A recent Law Review note outlined the two basic policy 
considerations involved with determining whether an antitrust 
violation should be a defense to a contract action as: 
1. Whether either of the parties would be un-
justly enriched by upholding or dismissing the 
defense; and 
2. Whether dismissal of the defense would make 
the court a party to the illegality. Note, Anti-
trust Violation as a Defense to Breach of Contract: 
An Expanded Policy Analysis, 30 U. of Miami L. Rev. 
1053 at 1055 (1976). 
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In the present case, neither of the parties would have 
been unjustly enriched by upholding the defense after the 
partial summary judgment was entered for $40,000, and 
staying the action pending a resolution of the antitrust 
claims. All of the cases which have denied the defense 
in holding or dicta have been concerned with the balancing 
problem explained by Justice Holmes' dissent in the Conti-
nental Wall Paper case, supra: 
••• the policy of not furthering the purposes 
of the trust is less important than the policy 
of preventing people from getting other people's 
property for nothing when they purport to be 
buying it. 212· U.S. at 270-271. 
Thus, in decidi"hg whether or not the defense of anti-
trust violation should be allowed in any particular case, 
a court should balance the policy of not judicially furthe~ 
ing the purposes of the illegal trust or combination, and 
the policy of preventing unjust enrichment. Applying this 
balancing standard to the present case, it becomes clear 
that after the partial summary judgment there was no possi-
bility of unjust enrichment--Keene Corporation received 
judgment for the value of the goods sold and delivered to 
Grating, Inc. At that point the policy of not allowing the 
courts to further the purposes of unlawful trusts should 
have become of dominant concern, and the court should have 
ruled that the defense would be available pending a deter-
mination in federal court of whether there was actually a 
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violation of the antitrust laws. 
By not staying the action, and by awarding Keene 
corporation the full $67,674.16 plus costs and attorney's 
fees, the lower court was in a sense a party to the alleged 
illegal price fixing scheme of Keene. If it is shown in the 
federal antitrust action currently pending that Keene was 
guilty of unlawfully fixing prices, then the lower court 
here will obviously be a party to that scheme by enforcing a 
contract for the illegally inflated price. 
All of the commentators writing directly on the s~bject 
agree that the most ·important considerations in determining 
whether or not to allow a defense of antitrust violation in 
a contract action are prevention of unjust enrichment and 
not allowing a court to enforce illegal agreements. See: 
Note, 30 u. of Miami L. Rev. 1053 (1976), supra; Sobel, 
Antitrust Defenses to Contract Actions: A Question of Policy 
Priorities, 16 Antitrust Bull. 455 (1971); Comment, The De-
fense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 758, 766 (1960); Note, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 
73 Harv. L. Rev. 126, 203-206 (1959); Lockhart, Violation of 
~ti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 Minn. 
L. Rev. 507, note 85 at 523 (1947). These writers generally 
agree that the best solution to this type of problem in a 
case involving goods sold and delivered, is to void the 
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contract and allow some type of quantum meruit recovery 
based on the value of the goods. 
Both of the important policy objections could have 
been realized by granting a stay, which appellant moved fM 
November 9, 1977, pending a determination of whether Keene 
violated the antitrust laws. If it is found in the Feder~ 
court action that the contract with Keene did violate the 
antitrust laws then Keene should only be allowed to recover 
the $40,000 representing the value of the grating materia~ 
sold. An award of any greater amount would be unjust 
enrichment for Keen~, and would make the court a party to 
the unlawful scheme. 
Since antitrust violations are not cognizable in state 
courts (15 u.s.c. S15; ~also, Sobel, 16 Antitrust Bull. 
455, 468-475, supra), the only proper course of action wou!C 
have been a stay pending a resolution of the Federal action. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
STATING THAT EQUITY WILL NOT STOP A COR-
PORATION DEALING WITH ANOTHER ON A 
FRIENDSHIP BASIS FROM BENEFITING BY ITS 
BREACH OF MORAL TRUST, AND DECLARING THAT 
THERE WAS NO LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES, IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND 
CONTRARY TO THE JUDGMENT AWARDING KEENE 
CORPORATION $66,674.16. 
In its Memorandum of Decision dated January 12, 1978, 
the lower court stated: 
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7. The problem which has caused the Court 
to study the issues in this case at length might 
be stated as follows: "When the executives of two 
corporations deal with one another on a friendship 
basis, with no legal relationship between them, 
but in a close human personal trusting relation-
ship, and one does not make a full disclosure but 
takes a limited advantage of the relationship, 
will equity step in and stop that corporation 
from benefiting by breach of moral trust?" The 
Court concludes that the law of sales and the 
statutes involved require the answer to be "no". 
(Record, pp. 191-92; emphasis added). 
This statement raises two important questions: 
A. Should one party to a contract or agreement be al-
lowed to benefit by its own breach of moral trust? 
B. Was the relationship between Keene Corporation and 
Grating, Inc. a legal relationship or was it based on friend-
ship alone? 
A. Should One Party To A Contract Or Agreement 
Be Allowed To Benefit By Its Own Breach Of 
Moral Trust? 
Utah Code Annotated §70A-1-203 provides: "Every con-
tract or duty within this act [Commercial Code] imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." 
"Good faith" is defined in Utah Code Annotated §70A-1-201(19) 
as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned". 
The testimony at trial and the court Memorandum Opinion 
shows that certain officers of Keene repeatedly assured 
Officers of Grating, Inc. that the price at which Keene was 
Hlling grating products was competitive. (See Transcript, 
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pp. 15-19, 21-24, 75-79, 127-133, 160, 150-151). The 
officers of Keene also told those of Grating, Inc. not ~ 
bother shopping around for lower prices, since no other 
manufacturer could offer them a better price. (Transcri~, 
pp. 15-19). The testimony and evidence also show very 
clearly that Keene's prices were not in fact at all com~t~ 
tive, and Grating, Inc. had been deliberately deceived ~l 
along. (Transcript, pp. 45-47, SO, 130-131, 155, 161). 
In paragraph 7 of its Memorandum of Decision, quoted 
above, the court finds that Keene did not make a full 
disclosure to Grating, Inc., breached a moral trust, and 
took advantage of the relationship between the two corpora· 
tions. This is not "honesty in fact", and is a clear 
breach of the statutory obligation of good faith in the 
performance of a contract or other duty. 
The lower court should not have allowed Keene to recove1 
on a contract which it has admittedly breached. At the most, 
Keene should have been awarded a quantum meru it recovery for 
the actual value of the goods, which was agreed to be 
$40 ,000. To allow Keene to recover the full contract price 
when it acted with admittedly bad faith would be inequitable 
and would encourage bad faith performance in the future. 
B. Was The Relationship Between Keene Corporation 
And Grating, Inc. A Legal Relationship Or was 
It Based On Friendship Alone? 
The lower court's classification of the relationship 
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between Keene and Grating as one based on friendship and a 
close human personal trust, rather than as a legal relation-
ship, raises a rather interesting paradox. 
If the relationship was a legal one based on contract, 
then Keene should not be allowed to recover on the contract 
because of its breach of the obligation of good faith as 
already discussed. 
On the other hand, if the relationship was based solely 
on friendship with no legal obligations incurred by either 
party, then Keene should not be allowed to come into court 
claiming breach of a contract and seeking damages. 'If Keene 
had only a moral obligation with 
Grating, then Grating had only a reciprocal moral obligation 
to pay the reasonable value of the goods sold and delivered. 
The apparent paradox created by the lower court's classi-
fication of the relationship as purely moral can be easily 
resolved. If it is determined that a legal relationship 
existed between Keene and Grating, then Keene's recovery 
would be limited to the reasonable value of the goods sold 
and delivered because of its breach of the statutory obliga-
tion of good faith. On the other hand, if the relationship 
is determined to be non-legal, but moral and personal, then 
Keene should not be allowed to recover the contract price of 
goods sold and delivered, since it is elementary law that 
-21-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
between Keene and Grating as one based on friendship and a 
close human personal trust, rather than as a legal relat~~ 
ship, raises a rather interesting paradox. 
If the relationship was a legal one based on contract, 
then Keene should not be allowed to recover on the contract 
because of its breach of the obligation of good faith as 
already discussed. 
On the other hand, if the relationship was based so~~ 
on friendship with no legal obligations incurred by either 
party, then Keene should not be allowed to come into court 
claiming breach of a contract and seeking damages. If Keene 
had only a moral obligation with 
Grating, then Grating had only a reciprocal moral obligation 
to pay the reasonable value of the goods sold and delivered. 
The apparent paradox created by the lower court's class1· 
fication of the relationship as purely moral can be easily 
resolved. If it is determined that a legal relationship 
existed between Keene and Grating, then Keene's recovery 
would be limited to the reasonable value of the goods sold 
and delivered because of its breach of the statutory obliga· 
tion of good faith. On the other hand, if the relationsh~ 
is determined to be non-legal, but moral and personal, then 
Keene should not be allowed to recover the contract price of 
goods sold and delivered, since it is elementary law that 
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Twenty, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Four, Twenty-Five, Twenty-Six, 
Twenty-Eight, Twenty-Nine and Thirty and not supported by 
either the Record of the court's Memorandum Opinion. 
It is evident from an examination of the Findings of 
Fact filed on January 24, 1977 that Keene is attempting to 
go beyond the issues in this case and assert Findings of 
Fact that may be favorable in the federal antitrust case 
regardless of whether the specific findings are supported by 
the evidence in this case. 
The court erred in not amending these findings in a 
manner consistent with its opinion and the Record as re-
quested by the Taylors' Motion to Alter or Amend. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is not a simple action for the purchase price 
of goods sold and delivered. A highly complex dimension is 
added to this case by the fact that a highly complex price 
fixing scheme is inextricably intertwined with contracts for 
the purchase of goods from Keene by Grating, Inc. 
Although the law is unclear as to what type of antitrust 
violations can be asserted as a defense to a contract action 
it is clear that in a proper case such violations can be 
asserted as a defense. 
In this case, having entered an Order for Partial 
Summary Judgment for the fair value of the goods received by 
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Grating thus preventing any possibility of unjust enrich~m 
by Grating, Inc., the court erred in refusing to stay the 
action pending the outcome of federal antitrust action and 
in striking the Taylors defense based on these violations as 
not being available as a matter of law. 
Further the court clearly erred in its conclusion th~ 
the law of sales will not prevent a party to a contract fr~ 
benefiting from its own breach of moral trust. 
Consequently, this court shuld reverse the District 
Court's Order of October 25, 1977 striking the defenses basei 
upon antitrust violations, reverse the Judgment together 
with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated Januacy 
24, 1978; reverse the Judgment together with Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated March 17, 1978 and reverse 
the Order dated March 17, 1978. 
Further this court should remand the case to the 
District Court with instructions to stay all proceedings, 
including any proceedings to collect the Partial Summary 
Judgment for $40,000, until the completion of the federal 
antitrust action. 
DATED this 'J.s;;; day of July, 1978. 
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